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Kinaesthetic Empathy as Aesthetic Experience  
of Music: A Phenomenological Approach
Jin Hyun Kim
Recently, there has been a growing interest in empirical approaches 
to aesthetic research questions involving neuroscientiic experiments 
(Chatterjee, 2013; Shimamura and Palmer, 2013; Tinto and Smith, 
2014).1 If research questions are especially concerned with aesthetic 
experience, methodological considerations for empirical aesthetics 
deserve thorough discussion, taking into account the fact that it is 
insuicient to use measurement or observation methods from the third-
person perspective to assess phenomenal irst-person experience. he 
relationship between the irst-person and the third-person perspectives 
can only be addressed by means of an appropriate description of irst-
person experience, which is not accessible through empirical research 
largely conducted from the third-person perspective and examined 
based on irst-person experiences. his initial thesis of my research leads 
to the exploration of a phenomenologically oriented empirical method 
appropriate to addressing the ways in which the aesthetic experience 
is constituted and the processes underlying that experience, without 
being necessarily aware of them while aesthetic experience takes place. 
In the following, a theoretical framework for the empirical investigation 
of aesthetic experience is introduced before discussing methodological 
considerations.
1 As a result, the research program “empirical aesthetics” has emerged (see for 
instance the recently founded Max Planck Institute for Empirical Aesthetics 
in Frankfurt). 
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Aesthetic Experience
Focusing on aesthetic experience, aesthetics is understood in this 
paper as a theory of aisthesis (αἴσθησις), sense perception, according 
to its Greek origin and following recent discussions in which the 
relationship between aisthesis and aesthetics is the focus and aesthetics is 
not limited to a theory of the beautiful as well (Welsch, 1987; Böhme, 
2001). Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, who spearheaded the study 
of aesthetics in the 18th century, established aesthetics as the science 
of sensate cognition (cognitionis sensitivae), in counterpart to logic, 
basing the term “aesthetics” on the Greek “aisthesis (αἴσθησις)”, sense 
perception, and emphasizes that there is clear but confused (not distinct) 
cognition also belonging to the realm of cognition; he calls this sensate 
cognition (Baumgarten, 1750). Clear and distinct cognition, considered 
human cognition since Descartes, is conceived of as ‘upper’ cognition 
underlying the act of thinking. According to Baumgarten—following 
Leibniz—the science of such cognition is logic. 
In introducing aesthetics, the acts of perceiving and imagining 
that cannot be fully embraced through human reason also become 
a subject of the science of cognition. Compared to the theories of 
cognition at present, sensate cognition is analogous to emotion, which, 
while considered part of cognition, cannot be reduced to reason-based 
cognition. Beyond discussion of to what extent questions of aesthetics 
can be studied within the scope of the current science of emotion, it is 
important to acknowledge that, in the establishment of aesthetics, sense 
perception was taken seriously as a subject of the science of cognition, 
and that a realm of cognition could be conceived of as irreducible to 
reason. In its origin, the central questions of aesthetics are directed 
towards clear but confused cognition related to sense perception, 
including the beautiful and sublime of a work of art—not towards the 
beautiful itself. In this paper, “aesthetic” is not used as identical with 
“beautiful”, but as a term comprising every predicate doing justice to 
aisthesis.
From the perspective of philosophy of consciousness, the aesthetic 
experience (of music) is based on a synthesis act of consciousness: scattered 
moments in the sense perception (of music)—(music) aesthesis—in the 
temporally irreversible succession of the process of artistic shaping or 
the recipient’s co-shaping are linked with experiencing (cf. Augustine; 
121
      
Kant; Husserl). According to Kant’s critique of pure reason (Kant, 1787: 
B 218f.), experience is only possible through this linking of perceived 
moments in term of the synthesis of consciousness. he moments of 
aisthesis and the aesthetic experience not only take in art perception 
and apprehension, but also in the process of artistic shaping. Augustine’s 
philosophy of music is related largely to the process of shaping music, 
especially the temporal process of creation. In his analysis of memoria in 
his Confessiones, Augustine allows for an understanding of memoria as a 
principle of the shaping process that constantly unfolds in irreversible 
temporal succession. According to him, memoria is not a reproductive 
act of information retrieval, but a productive act that spans the present 
moment, which is passing over time, yet made present in the moments 
past and moments to come so as to become an object of aisthesis, and 
links them together to constitute a unity of aesthetic experience. 
If we understand musical units not in terms of what can be called 
“hyperchronic” (cf. Luckner, 2007), i.e. stable beyond a given temporal 
context of a musical event or boundaries of a musical piece, but in 
terms of what can be called interchronic,2 related to each other through 
irreversible temporal succession, the aesthetic experience of music can 
then be conceived of as emerging and unfolding continuously in the 
process of music-making or music perception over time. his might 
provide an explanation of the extent to which a tone for self-exposure 
(for instance of a baby’s instinctive crying) serving to “discharge”, not 
to “stay by” (Dewey, 1934, p. 64) cannot serve to aesthetic experience. 
he late 19th century musicologist Hausegger contends in his seminal 
monograph “Music as Expression (Die Musik als Ausdruck)” (1887) that, 
to shape a sound that can be developed further, the impulse should retain 
its state of arousal. When retaining an aroused state, the afected muscle 
generally cannot remain in consistent contraction; it thus moves toward 
periodic activity, in turn inluencing the resulting duration, height, 
2 he German philosopher Andreas Luckner suggests the term ‘isochronic’ 
for reference to the intra-musical relation of musical units tied to time 
(LucKner, 2007, p. 45, 47). Taking into account the current discussion 
on musical rhythm and meter, in which the term ‘isochronic’ refers to a 
periodic process of the same duration and is assigned to musical meter, 
‘interchronic’ is suggested here as a term neutrally referring to the intra-
temporal relation of musical units.
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and depth of vocalization. (Hausegger, 1887, p. 10-11, 62), forming 
dynamic expressions of one’s aroused states.3 John Dewey contends that 
“fulilling, consummating, are continuous functions, not mere ends, 
located at one place only. … [An artist] is in process of completing 
at every stage of his work. He must at each point retain and sum up 
what has gone before as a whole and with reference to a whole to 
come.” (Dewey, 1934, p. 58).
John Dewey’s theory on aesthetic experience in Art as Experience 
(1934) explicitly tackles how the experience is based on the mechanisms 
of action-perception cycle underlying an artist’s shaping process. 
According to Dewey, an artist’s shaping process is based on this 
reciprocal and cumulative relationship between doing and undergoing; 
this “union between doing and undergoing” (ibid., p. 54) is the basis 
on which an artist shapes and reshapes their production process to 
fulilment or perfection (cf. Dewey, 1934, p. 36), and out of which 
an immediate sense of a unity of aesthetic experience emerges (ibid., 
p. 52): “he series of doings in the rhythm of experience give variety and 
movement; …he undergoings are the corresponding elements in the 
rhythm, and they supply unity” (p. 58). Such a union also underlies the 
perception and appreciation of a work of art. Dewey contends that this 
kind of receptive act “accumulating toward objective fulilment” goes 
beyond passivity (p. 54); when perceiving and appreciating an artwork, 
the beholder (re-)creates the artist’s experience of the process of dynamic 
organization in the work (p. 56). 
he coupling of action and perception underlying the aesthetic 
experience—whether in the shaping or co-shaping process—was 
addressed much earlier in heodor Lipps’ theory on aesthetic empathy 
(“Einfühlung”), developed in the context of psychological aesthetics at 
the end of the 19th century (cf. Lipps, 1903a). ‘Einfühlung,’ the original 
German term for empathy, was used in the 19th century in a much 
broader sense than it is currently used in social psychology and cognitive 
neuroscience (Lipps, 1907); it refers not only to an interpersonal process 
unmediated by what is normally understood as the rational mode of 
thinking in current research on empathy, but also to an implicit and 
3 here can be the aesthetic experience of a singular sound, if it is shaped, 
carried forward dynamically (over time) and “worked out to completion” 
(DeWeY, 1934, p. 64).
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immediate process taking place in aesthetic experience and appreciation 
(Currie, 2011). Lipps’ concept embraces the imaginative projection 
of oneself onto inanimate objects of aesthetic contemplation, thereby 
relating one’s experience to certain properties of an object (Lipps, 1900, 
p. 415). Following him, the aesthetic object and one’s own feelings 
experienced in conjunction with this object cannot be strictly separated: 
“I am inwardly in or by an object, not somehow, but with my own 
personal quality” (Lipps, 1900, p. 416, translated by the author); the 
“experienced quality of myself appears as a certainty of the aesthetic 
object” (ibid., p. 417). Moritz Geiger characterizes an (aesthetic) 
experience based on empathy as being uniied between the “I” observing 
an object and the “I” felt into the object (Geiger, 1911, p. 37, translated 
by the author); in other words: here is the correspondence between 
“the objectiied and ongoing (actual) personality” (Lipps, 1900, p. 420), 
which allows for a “unity of activity and objectivity” (p. 422). 
For Lipps, feeling into an aesthetic object or another person is based 
neither on the recognition of an aesthetic object’s signiicant properties 
nor on subjectively felt emotions induced by such properties, but on 
“inner doing” (Lipps, 1903b, p. 186) or “inner imitation” (p. 191)—
more precisely, “my experienced doing” (p. 187), which he characterizes 
as a kind of image of movement. Lipps distinguishes this from what he 
terms organic sensations such as muscle contraction or relaxation (Lipps, 
1903b), at present considered kinaesthesia. To characterise the image of 
movement Lipps introduced as a basis for aesthetic empathy, Edward 
Bradford Titchener—who coined ‘empathy’ as a rendering of Einfühlung 
in Lectures on the Experimental Psychology of the hought‑Processes 
(1909)—used the concept of ‘kinaesthetic image’, distinguished from 
‘kinaesthetic sensation’. His metaphorical description of the kinaesthetic 
image makes its diference from the kinaesthetic sensation clear: “Not 
only do I see gravity and modesty and pride and courtesy and stateliness, 
but I feel or act them in the mind’s muscle” (Titchener, 1909, p. 21).
Kinaesthetic Empathy 
A very recent discourse on kinaesthetic empathy, appropriating 
choreographic terms in light of a number of neuroscientiic studies on 
the neural mechanisms of the coupling of action and perception, takes 
up Lipps’ notion of inner activity underlying aesthetic empathy (Foster, 
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2010; Reason and Reynolds, 2010; Reynolds and Reason, 2012b). 
‘Kinaesthetic empathy’ refers to “the ability to experience empathy 
merely by observing the movements of another human being” (Reynolds 
and Reason, 2012a). his construct is linked to the discovery of mirror 
neurons and further investigations on human mirror mechanisms 
indicating that action simulation is involved in empathy, i.e. feeling into 
others, while observing them—albeit not accompanied by the execution 
of own action (Decety and Ipkes, 2009). It is however not clear yet 
precisely what is meant by ‘kinaesthetic’ in that context. In a very 
recent compendium on kinaesthetic empathy, Dee Reynolds contends 
that the concept “took on particular prominence in relation to dance 
and the aesthetics of movement” (Reynolds and Reason, 2012b, p. 19) 
he American dance critic John Martin’s proposal in the 1930s—that 
watching dance involves “spectators’ muscular and emotional responses to 
watching dancers” (Martin, 1939, p. 49; 1936, p. 117, cited in Reynolds 
and Reason, 2012b, p. 19), which in turn relies on “the faculty of ‘inner 
mimicry’” (Martin, 1939, p. 55, cited in Reason and Reynolds, 2010, 
p. 54)—serves as a background of the current discourse on kinaesthetic 
empathy in the context of dance research (Foster, 2010; Reason and 
Reynolds, 2010; Reynolds, 2012; Reynolds and Reason, 2012b). It can 
be noted that, when considering the diference between kinaesthetic 
sensation and image discussed by Titchener, Martin’s proposal places 
emphasis on the kinaesthetic sensation having a physiological dimension 
while watching dance performance. On the other hand, his emphasis 
on the faculty of ‘inner mimicry’ is based on Lipps’ concept of ‘inner 
doing’ or ‘inner imitation’, which is however clearly distinguished from 
kinaesthetic sensation. herefore, discourse on kinaesthetic empathy 
working with both Lipps’ empathy and Martin’s kinaesthetic sensation 
and inner mimicry needs to be elaborated, taking into account the 
relationship between kinaesthetic sensation and kinaesthetic image in 
the context aesthetic empathy (cf. Kim, 2012).
Kinaesthesia is, according to the Greek, the sense (aisthesis) of 
movement (kineô) comprising proprioception, the sense of the position 
of parts of the body. his is involved in both the execution and the 
imagination of action (Berthoz and Petit, 2008 [2006]) as well as in 
perception—in case of exteroception, regardless of which kind of sense: 
sight, hearing, taste, smell or touch. Kinaesthesia is diferent from both 
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exteroception and interoception, but at the same time acts as a mediator 
between the inner and the outer (cf. Husserl, 1997). 
Sense perception involving kinaesthesia is in line with Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological theory of perception tackling the 
relationship—based on a non-linear, circular causality between an 
organism and its environment (cf. Merleau-Ponty, 2002 [1945]). he 
lived body as the very space of perception is a fundamental mode of 
being-in-the-world, unifying the self and objects (cf. Zaner, 1971, 
p. 161-162); kinaesthesia is a sense perceived by the lived body that 
cannot be observed from an external observer point of view. Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology of perception, in which the chiasmus of the 
self and the world comes to the fore, focuses on the coupling of action 
and perception; according to Merleau-Ponty, perception is not a passive 
act processed through bodily mediation of sensory data, but an active 
process involving motor actions (Merleau-Ponty, 1963 [1942]; Merleau-
Ponty, 2002 [1945]). Kinaesthesia as a sense of motor actions guiding 
diferent senses in perception can therefore be seen as a model for the 
coupling of action and perception underlying both motor actions and 
perception. As a result, the involvement of kinaesthesia in perception 
is evidence for the coupling of motor and sensory processes underlying 
embodied cognition (cf. Varela, hompson and Rosch, 1991; Clark 
1997; Calvo and Gomila, 2008).
Keeping in mind that aesthetics as discussed in this paper is 
understood as a theory of aisthesis, it should be noted that sensate 
cognition cannot be reduced to the processing of sensory data, but 
rather should be conceived of as a process mediating sensory perception 
and sense-based experience. Taking for granted the involvement of 
kinaesthesia in perception mediated by diferent senses, the question 
raised at this point is whether and how kinaesthesia plays a role for 
aisthesis. 
In recent neuroaesthetic studies, the aesthetic idea related to the 
concept of kinaesthetic empathy has served as a theoretical framework 
for experimental aesthetics, though the term ‘kinaesthetic empathy’ has 
not been used explicitly; rather mechanisms of empathy are related to 
those of action simulation and of kinaesthesia. Up to the present, such 
neuroaesthetic experiments have been conducted on people beholding 
visual arts (Di Dio et al., 2007; Di Dio and Gallese, 2009; Gallese, 
2010) and dance performances (Calvo-Merino et al., 2006, 2008; Jola 
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et al., 2011, 2012). Where the aesthetic concept of “the beautiful” 
has mostly dominated neuroaesthetics (cf. Zeki, 1999; Kawabata and 
Zeki, 2004; Jacobsen et al., 2006), these studies center on empathic 
aisthesis. In the visual arts, David Freedberg and Vittorio Gallese 
(2007) consider both felt activation of the muscles as reported by 
viewers of Michelangelo’s sculpture Prisoners, and embodied simulation 
of the motor program elicited by the viewer’s empathic engagement 
with Caravaggio’s painting Incredulity of Saint homas (1601-1602). 
Freedberg and Gallese characterise the former as “bodily empathy” 
(Freedberg and Gallese, 1997, p. 197) and the latter as “empathetic 
simulation of the somatic feeling” (p. 201). Likewise, Cinzia Di Dio, 
et al. (2007), investigating neural activity in viewers of Classical and 
Renaissance sculptures, reported the elicitation of activation in the 
ventral premotor and posterior parietal cortices. Researchers involved 
in this study interpreted the result—in line with the studies on human 
mirror mechanisms—as an evidence of motor resonance taking place 
during observing those sculptures in congruence with “the implied 
movements portrayed in the sculptures” (Di Dio and Gallese, 2009, 
p. 683). 
For the performing arts, especially dance, Beatriz Calvo-Merino et 
al. (2006), conducted several experiments comparing the perception 
of dance styles in regard to the audience’s conversancy or lack thereof, 
and of gender-speciic dance movements whose visual similarities and 
motor similarities were used for experiment design (Calvo-Merino et al., 
2006); the results, from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 
showed activation of areas such as the premotor cortex (ventral and 
dorsal sections), the superior parietal lobe and interior parietal sulcus in 
the parietal cortex, and the posterior of the superior temporal sulcus that 
belong to the action observation network. Aesthetically responsible brain 
areas related to dance perception—“sensorimotor aesthetic tuning during 
observation of dance movements” (Calvo-Merino, 2010, p. 169)—have 
also been identiied in the premotor cortex in the right hemisphere and 
visual cortex bilaterally (Calvo-Merino et al., 2008). Corinne Jola et 
al. (2011) investigated the relationship between kinaesthetic sensation 
(“phenomenological experience”) and motor simulation (“mirror neuron 
activity”) (Jola, 2010, p. 219), starting from a study on dancers’ 
expertise in proprioception and conducting further neurophysiological 
experiments on the (aesthetic) perception of dance in combination 
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with subjective reports on kinaesthetic sensation as experienced during 
observation of diferent dance movements (Jola et al., 2012).
In the context of neuroaesthetics, the role of kinaesthesia for aisthesis 
has been implicitly and explicitly discussed in relation to the simulation 
of motor action, which is based on neural mechanisms of the coupling 
of action and perception. However, the diference between kinaesthetic 
sensation and kinaesthetic image up to the present has not been discussed 
as thoroughly as other terms. Bodily empathy as a kind of empathic 
aisthesis (Freedberg and Gallese, 2007) and kinaesthetic sensation as a 
mechanism of kinaesthetic empathy (Jola, 2010; Jola et al., 2012) refer 
to something neither originally meant by ‘empathy’ nor considered as a 
core mechanism of empathy; however, both phrases are used to describe 
kinaesthetic dimensions in conjunction with the coupling of action 
and perception underlying aesthetic experience of the ine arts. Hence, 
given that kinaesthesia serves as a fundamental of aesthetic empathy, 
a necessary step forward is a more thorough consideration of to what 
extent kinaesthesia is involved in aesthetic experience.
Phenomenological Interviews with Various Musicians
To investigate to what extent kinaesthesia is involved in aesthetic 
experience—and more precisely: whether kinaesthetic sensations 
or kinaesthetic images underlie the aesthetic experience of music, 
several phenomenological interviews with various musicians have been 
conducted. hese interview studies aim to develop interview techniques 
appropriate to investigating the aesthetic experience of music taking 
place during the process of shaping music, which is inaccessible as irst-
person experience yet can be retrospectively assessed by an interview. 
First-person experience, which is not directly accessible to a third person, 
is often neither immediately accessible to its owner (cf. Vermersch, 1994; 
Petitmengin, 2006). hough irst-person experience is a rapid process, 
it has a structure and can become explicit using certain techniques such 
as meditation (ibid.). 
Phenomenological interview techniques, the main foundation for 
the interview studies introduced here, have been developed in France 
beginning in the mid-1990s within the scope of a neurophenomenological 
research program (Varela, 1996; Lutz et al., 2002; Lutz and hompson, 
2003) and further by the French philosopher Claire Petitmengin 
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(Petitmengin-Peugeot, 1999; Petitmengin, 2006, 2007, 2011; 
Petitmengin et al., 2006, 2007, 2009; Petitmengin and Bitbol, 2009) 
to address the “explicitation interview” (Vermersch, 1994). he irst-
person reports reveal multifaceted aspects related to one’s own experience 
proceeding over time, and are not purely subjective, since these reports 
on irst-person experience are accomplished with the help of another 
person (interviewer). he interviewer acts as a mediator who helps 
participants relect on their experience in a conscious way and make it 
explicit. I-descriptions are collected from the second-person perspective. 
he second-person perspective is intersubjective, allowing access to 
another person in a social context; this ofers access to data closer to the 
irst-person perspective 4, a perspective on one’s own experience, than the 
third-person observation of others can provide. he phenomenological 
interview techniques allow for retrospection directly related to the 
aesthetic experience of music that has just taken place during the process 
of shaping music; this is recalled, for instance, in terms of speciic 
perception modalities, bodily attention and conscious images, etc. his 
kind of interview may take the role of the reconstruction of memory 
processes.5 
Up to the present, I have explored the phenomenological interview 
techniques based on the second-person perspective in four diferent 
studies. In this section, I only describe the procedure and results of 
the case study that is conducted in collaboration with the Institute of 
Psychoacoustics and Electronic Music (IPEM) at the University of Ghent, 
in which I irst used the phenomenological interview techniques. his 
case study was carried out to test the hypothesis that the mechanisms of 
empathy underlie musical expressiveness, as experienced by professional 
musicians during the ongoing processes of their performance; the 
mechanisms of empathy were only indirectly investigated, through 
modifying the performance conditions constraining the performer’s 
4 Gallagher and Sørensen (2006, p. 121) point out that some 
phenomenologists distinguish between introspection and the 
phenomenological method; the latter embraces intersubjectively accessible 
modes of experience, whereas the former concerns the participants’ private 
and psychological experiences.
5 In the philosophy of consciousness, a synthesis act of consciousness is 
conceived of as underlying memory processes (to name a few philosophers 
relevant to the theme of research proposed here: Augustine, Kant, Husserl).
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coordination of auditory perception and motor action. A primary research 
question concerned the role of empathy in the process of shaping music 
for the performer’s self-experience of musical expressiveness during the 
ongoing process of performance—whether an empathic process serves as 
a basis for how the performer experiences the performance as expressive. 
Musical performance founded on an empathetic process allows the 
performer to feel herself / himself into the performance. A hypothesis of 
the case study was that musical performance by professional musicians 
would not merely be an act of expression of the performer’s own 
emotions or imagined emotions, but rather a process of going along 
with music, devotion of the self to the music, largely based on automatic 
processes available through embodied knowledge of the relationships 
between how to play, how this playing sounds, and how that sound feels. 
To test this hypothesis, a sight-reading performance and a practiced 
performance of the same piece, which the experimental subjects had 
never previously played, were taken as two diferent conditions of musical 
performance, which may impact the empathic process underlying musical 
performance. he case study was carried out with three professional 
musicians—a gamba player, clarinetist, and singer. hey were instructed 
to play unfamiliar two pieces, the style of which they were conversant 
with. Each piece was irst sight-read, then reperformed after 20 minutes 
worth of practicing. he subjects’ self-reports on musical expressiveness 
experienced during the ongoing processes of musical performance were 
collected through post-experimental phenomenological interviews. In 
addition, the musicians’ irst-person reports were taken into account 
when analyzing the musicians’ bodily micro-gestures as recorded by 
motion capture devices (cf. Kim, 2010; Kim et al., 2010). 
he interviewer’s task was to direct the musicians’ recall into their 
experiences only in relation to the concrete events occurring during their 
performance, and to help them make their experiences explicit—not 
based on knowledge of how to perform a piece, but instead recalling 
what concrete processes related to experienced musical expressiveness 
look like. To compare the collected self-reports to the gestural data 
measured from a third-person perspective, both the sight-reading and 
practiced performances of each performer were ilmed using a Casio 
EX‑F1 digital camera, enabling a high-speed video recording at 300fps 
to observe the performers’ micro-gestures in detail, and a motion capture 
system (Optitrack, Natural Point) installed in the IPEM laboratory at the 
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University of Ghent to analyze signiicant performance micro-gestures. 
My focus on performance micro-gestures was based on my assumption 
that there would be only very slight diferences in overall macro-gestures 
between the same performer’s sight-reading and practiced performance, 
given that professional musicians are capable of playing music on sight 
in an expressive manner when they are familiar with the musical style. 
In this paper, I largely report on the result of the interviews, and 
only partially treat the more signiicant results of the analyses of the 
test persons’ micro-gestures.6 Oral interviews with each performer were 
carried out based on this informal questionnaire, which was completed 
by each performer after the musical performances:
1. How do you judge your sight-reading performances? Were they 
more than simple sight-reading performances? If either yes or 
not, how did you notice this?
2. Did you consciously monitor your sight-reading performances? If 
yes, what did this monitoring look like?
3. Were there any bodily or visceral reactions during your sight-
reading performances? If yes, do you remember what they felt 
like?
4. Did you experience your sight-reading performances as expressive? 
If either yes or not, what did your experience look like?
5. Did you ind your practiced performances expressive? If either yes 
or not, what did your experience of musical expressiveness look 
like?
6. Did you consciously monitor your practiced performances? If 
yes, what did this monitoring look like?
7. Were there any bodily or visceral reactions during your practiced 
performances? If yes, do you remember what they felt like?
he gamba player answered that he consciously monitored technical 
aspects during the sight-reading, especially left hand position with regard 
to ingering techniques. During the practiced performance he noticed 
“the swaying movement of [his] shoulder,” which he characterizes 
as a natural movement accompanying his performances. During the 
sight-reading, some visceral reactions indicating tension and stress were 
noticed instead of bodily reactions that felt natural. After practice, 
6 See Kim et al., 2010 for a detailed discussion on the analyses of the test 
persons’ micro-gestures in connection with the audio analysis.
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he did not notice any visceral reactions, but experienced “micro-level 
expressiveness” emerging during the ongoing processes of musical 
performance.
he clarinetist reported that he had “low experiences” during 
the practiced performance, guided by “unconstrained and efortless 
feelings.” He was not aware of his kinaesthetic sensations during the 
ongoing processes of musical performance, except when something 
wrong occurred – for instance, when “bodily movements interfere with 
instrumental techniques.” In this case, he consciously concentrates on 
“proximal bodily actions” and “kinesthetic feedback” rather than “aural 
feedback.” He consciously monitored the sight-reading and noticed 
musical expressiveness due to this monitoring, instead of feeling his 
bodily movements going along with the ongoing processes of musical 
performance as in the case of the practiced performances.
he singer found the sight-reading signiicantly less expressive than 
the practiced performance. During the sight-reading performances, 
she was aware of her “nervousness and bodily tensions”, only focusing 
on relevant “intramusical features” of the music. During the practiced 
performances, she could consciously monitor some changes of her 
facial expressions and hand gestures corresponding to her “prepared 
emotional intentions,” which were conirmed through “aural feedback”. 
On the other hand, she noticed “[her] breathing and muscle activities 
automatically in the practiced performances, although [she] is usually 
only aware of and consciously monitors these when they somehow 
interfere.”
Some common experiences all three musicians emphasize can be 
summarized as follows: he subjects could feel themselves into their 
own performance in an expressive way when the playing actions 
and perceptions of produced sounds via corporeally-based sensations 
matched well. his process of empathy was not based on conscious 
monitoring through reasoning, but was achieved pre-relectively. Only 
when something wrong occurred, the performer was explicitly aware 
of the ongoing process; at that point, the performer tried to improve 
the performance by focusing on this process, overshadowing the 
empathic going along with the music. Bodily and visceral reactions 
which were felt as negative, in the sense that the musicians would not 
be used to experiencing such reactions in their normal performance 
situations, were noticed during the sight-reading, indicating tension, 
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stress or concentration on unfamiliar music. However, in the practiced 
performances, all three musicians pre-relectively felt their natural 
bodily movements going along with the ongoing processes of musical 
performance. Performative expressiveness resulting from the performance 
in which the performer felt unconstrained or less constrained, and more 
attuned with the ongoing processes of performance, was experienced 
signiicantly more during the practiced performances compared to the 
sight-reading performances; this was due to the newfound familiarity 
with the music piece from both technical and interpretative points of 
view. 
he results of interviews were related to the analyses of the gamba 
player’s and the clarinetist’s corporeal micro-gestures; this was not done 
with the singer, as she used comparably few micro-gestures under the 
sight-reading and practiced performance conditions. he interview 
with the singer indicates that the singer’s respiration and muscle tension 
should be measured to ind results signiicant in comparison to the 
gamba player’s and clarinetist’s corporeal micro-gestures as analyzed by 
the motion capture device. For the instrumentalists, signiicant micro-
gestures which occurred at the beginning and end of a musical passage, 
and difered from each other under the two performance conditions, 
were irst manually annotated from the high-speed video. Motion 
capture data were then used to compare these gestures between both 
performances. 
he gamba player’s signiicantly diferent micro-gestures were related 
to the upper left arm. It remained static except for ingering movements 
in the sight-reading performance, whereas it tended to widen or move 
outwards and inwards in the practiced performance. hese results can 
be interpreted in context with the gamba player’s irst-person report 
on tension and stress as felt during the sight-reading and on ‘naturally’ 
swaying shoulder movements noticed by him during the practiced 
performances. A small range of the gamba player’s left arm movements 
analyzed in the sight-reading indicates his concentration on left inger 
positions during that performance, which as he reported prevented him 
from going along with the music in a ‘natural’ way. On the other hand, 
a wider range of motion in his left arm accompanied an increase in 
duration of the corresponding notes in the practiced performance; this 
relects the gamba player’s report on the feeling of going along with the 
practiced performance expressively, while noticing his swaying shoulder. 
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For the clarinetist, the observed micro-gestures consist of vertical 
and horizontal movements, raising or lowering the clarinet, and turning 
the clarinet left or right. he absolute height of the clarinetist’s bell, 
indicating a higher velocity, was larger in the practiced performance 
compared to the sight-reading. his result corresponds to the clarinetist’s 
report on musical expressiveness as pre-relectively felt by him during 
the practiced performance compared to the musical expressiveness 
relectively monitored during the sight-reading. Taking into account 
his self-reported “concentration on the timing and rhythm during both 
performances”, the changes in dynamics—which he apparently did 
not consciously pay attention to—seem to be related to performative 
expressiveness as pre-relectively felt by him during the ongoing 
processes of the practiced performance. 
In this case study, it could be ascertained that kinaesthesia is 
involved in aesthetic experience in general and in aesthetic empathy 
in particular, in the sense that the musicians pre-relectively felt their 
natural bodily movements going along with the ongoing processes of 
musical performance. But it has not become clear whether there is a 
diference between kinaesthetic images and kinaesthetic sensations while 
experiencing kinaesthetic empathy. hough kinaesthetic sensations 
normally guide each process of shaping music, they were considerably 
noticed in the sight-reading performances rather than in the practiced 
performances. he practiced performances as experienced by the 
musicians was barely monitored in the consciousness, but rather felt 
attuned with and guided by expressive corporeal micro-gestures used 
pre-relectively by the musicians. he musicians could retrospectively 
recall the feeling of their bodily movements going along with the 
ongoing processes of musical performance. Nevertheless, it does not 
seem that this is experienced in terms of kinaesthetic sensations. Further 
interview studies with other musicians I have conducted indicate that 
aesthetic empathy is experienced, primarily guided by kinaesthetic 
images. To ind a generic structure of kinaesthetic empathy, however, it 
is necessary to carry out more studies. As a next step, it would also be 
desirable to investigate the aesthetic experience of music in the process of 
music perception to compare with that in the process of music making.
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